The KCL Intelligence and Security Group invites you to a presentation on psychology and intelligence surprise with a world-leading expert.
About this event
In some so-called intelligence failures, a lack of critical information has accounted for the outcome. But in others - Operation Barbarossa, the Korean and Yom Kippur Wars - the victim had an almost complete intelligence picture but was surprised nonetheless. How are intelligence experts to account for this?
In this presentation, Professor Uri Bar-Joseph takes a close look at the events which preceded these and other catastrophes in intelligence history. Drawing from his most recent book, Sudden Attack: Intelligence and Leadership in the Ultimate Test,Bar-Joseph discusses a pattern in several cases: a key person in the warning-response process misperceived the looming threat and acted in ways that led to a systemic malfunction.
Professor Uri Bar-Joseph is professor emeritus in the Department of International Relations of the School of Political Science at Haifa University, Israel. He concentrates on strategic and intelligence studies, especially focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli security policy. In addition to numerous refereed journal articles and book chapters, he has published six books, the most recent of which are The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel (2016), with Rose McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor (2017), and Sudden Attack: Intelligence and Leadership in the Ultimate Test (Hebrew, 2019)