Geopolitics in South Asia, especially Afghanistan, is marked by big power rivalry: for most of the 19th century between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain (termed the ‘Great Game’ by Captain Arthur Connolly and immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his poem 'Kim') and in the 20th century between the Soviet Union and the United States. The advent of the 21st century witnessed the ‘Global War on Terrorism’, with South Asia, once again, finding itself in the eye of the storm, enduring almost 20 years of further military intervention. However, almost simultaneously, and somewhat surreptitiously, a subdued player in the recent history of South Asia has entered the region - China. At the moment it is doing so not through invasion or manipulation, but by promising trade and commerce, infrastructure development, industrialisation, non-interference in modes of governance and respect for state sovereignty in bilateral relations. In building its case, and in trying to distinguish itself from the fore-mentioned big powers, China invokes ancient concepts, such as the ‘Silk Road’ and uses iconography symbolising centuries of peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit to the countries of the region and beyond. This piece asks the question of whether China has learnt lessons from the failures of other states.
There are striking similarities between the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century and the subsequent Soviet/US-Afghan wars: the initial ease with which the invaders succeeded in conquering Afghanistan, the brief lull and false sense of calm in the beginning of an occupation, the greed of Afghan elites, the brevity of Afghan hospitality, the religious zealotry in Afghan society, the lack of respect for central authority, and finally the fortitude to resist foreign occupation, generation after generation.
Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-1989
The 40th Soviet Army crossed the river Oxus into Afghanistan in late December 1979. Requests for assistance by the communist government of Afghanistan against a growing Islamic insurgency was the official excuse presented by the Soviets to justify the invasion. As with all invasions of Afghanistan, the beginning was relatively smooth. The more independent minded Hafizullah Amin was killed by the Russians, and their puppet Babrak Karmal was installed as the President. The Soviet General Staff’s plan was to train and equip the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, stabilize the communist government through development programs, and extract Soviet forces within three years.
However, after a decade of devastation for the Afghans, with 1.3 million dead, 7.5 million displaced (as internal or external refugees), and a ruined economy, the Soviets left Afghanistan in defeat in February 1989. On the Soviet side, despite much lower official numbers of dead and injured soldiers, independent estimates suggest around 26,000 died and 50,000 were injured. There are harrowing tales of the post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suffered by Soviet troops, and the lingering side effects of the war on Soviet society. The most iconic photo depicting the defeat of the 40th Soviet Army pictured the words ‘Good Bye Afghanistan’ written in Russian by the retreating troops, using their bullets and weapons to create letters and the parched Afghan dirt as their canvas.
The US-Afghan War (‘War on Terror’)
9/11 is the watershed event that shaped international relations in the first quarter of the 21st century. The US military bombed Afghanistan within days of the attacks. True to historic form, the Afghan Taliban were toppled by the Northern Alliance force, backed by US air power and special forces, before Christmas 2001. Hamid Karzai, a Pakistan-based, low level Afghan commander and CIA asset, was declared the interim President of Afghanistan.
Within a couple of years, with no sign of US troop withdrawal on the cards, the Taliban started making a comeback. Billions of dollars in military and civilian aid had started pouring into Afghanistan, despite a lack of structural capability to deal with this investment. The result was rampant corruption among politicians, civilian officials, and the newly raised Afghan National Army leadership, with the Taliban receiving their share as protection money.
After failed troop surges and drawdowns during the Obama and Trump administrations, on 14 April 2021 the incoming Biden administration announced the complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by 11 September 2021, the 20th anniversary of 9/11. The unexpected collapse of the Afghan Army, the fleeing of Kabul by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, and the iconic photographs of desperate Afghans hanging on to the landing gears of US planes taking off at Kabul airport, symbolized the end of this period of Afghanistan's history. The following words by President Biden during a speech in July 2021 encapsulated the situation perfectly:
After twenty years, a trillion dollars spent on training and equipping hundreds of thousands of Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANSDF), 2,448 Americans killed, 20,772 more wounded, and untold thousands coming home with unseen trauma to their mental health - I will not send another generation of Americans to war in Afghanistan with no reasonable expectation of achieving a different outcome.
The Chinese approach
The miraculous explosion in China’s economy this century was best described by former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd as “the British Industrial Revolution and the global information revolution combusting simultaneously and compressed into not 300 years, but 30”. Fearing a trade war with the West - manifesting right now - and the resultant loss of markets and therefore production, Chinese strategic thinkers, led by President Xi Jinping, decided to invest their vast financial reserves into infrastructure modernization in the developing world. This was not done out of sheer benevolence but was designed to create future markets for Chinese goods and cheap labor destinations for their sunset industries. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was formally launched globally by China in 2014, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as its flagship project. CPEC provides a land bridge for China to gain direct access to the Indian Ocean, via the Gwadar Port at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, bypassing the choke points blocking its Sea Lanes of Communication. CPEC also enables China to generate economic growth in the Muslim region of Xinjiang, and the original plan included the eventual extension of the project into Afghanistan to develop and exploit its natural resources, especially minerals.
With initial enthusiasm regarding CPEC waning in Pakistan, and the law-and-order situation remaining volatile along its route, especially in the Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, the Chinese have started to consciously plan to bypass Pakistan, preparing for a worst-case scenario. Afghanistan seems to be the ideal choice, with a railway connection already established through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to the port of Hairatan on the Oxus River in northern Afghanistan ,and the already completed Kahf-Herat railway link between Afghanistan and Iran. A second shorter link is being considered through the Wakhan Strip between Afghanistan and China. Although a daunting task due to the inhospitable terrain through the Pamir mountains and threats from Uyghur militants, the Chinese have already completed similar projects in the area, for example connecting China to Central Asian states as part of the BRI.
To ensure this eventuality, the Chinese have made some subtle moves after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. The opening of a de-facto Chinese mission in Kabul to support its investments, especially rare-earth minerals, can be seen as a move designed to embrace the Taliban without formal recognition. Negotiations have also started on a trans-Afghanistan railway project, which will eventually connect China through Central Asia and Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chahbahar. If completed successfully, this would lessen China’s dependence on Russian railways to reach Europe, on Pakistan and on CPEC. China is also eyeing engagement with the Taliban in order to get preferential mining contracts for $1-3 trillion worth of minerals including, copper, lithium and other rare-earth elements. All in all, while President Trump is spending time thinking about getting back US weapons left in Afghanistan, China is making itself indispensable to the Afghans and is doing so virtually without any competition (save perhaps from India).
Conclusion
Reading the history of the Western interventions in Afghanistan, one cannot help wonder whether the Chinese have studied these and have discovered a recuring pattern, wherein, relatively easy initial successes in the battlefield lulled the invaders into a sense of complacency. Perhaps they have reflected on the mistakes other states have made in thinking they can occupy this geopolitically vital country, mistakes in thinking they could remodel its highly conservative, tribal, proud, landlocked society, into a 'modern western-styled state' at the point of a gun. More intriguing is the fact that since the First Anglo-Afghan War, all subsequent aggressors were cognizant of the ground realities and tried to avoid the quagmire that is ruling Afghanistan. Their first instincts were to place a puppet on the throne in Kabul, train an Afghan national army to support the puppet, and rule the country by proxy. The (albeit slow) progress in modernization of education and infrastructure that was made between the Third Anglo-Afghan war (1919-21) and the Soviet invasion (1979) has been wiped out in the past 45 years of unabated conflict. This might help to answer the question of why many Afghans accept and support the medieval Taliban: perhaps it is because the Taliban bring a sense of peace, stability, a comparative reduction in corruption, and foremost the belief that core conservative Afghan values are safe in their hands.
Moving forward, all concerned parties should understand these sentiments and allow Afghan society to heal for a while. Afghans, due to their inherent independence, will chart their own course. This is what China seems to have understood and is, therefore, successfully engaging the Afghans without passing moral judgements on their governance preferences. In filling the vacuum left behind by the West, the Chinese are making significant geo-strategic gains, which in time may make China the lynchpin controlling the vast natural resources and trade routes between South, Central and West Asia.
Faisal Ajmal is a retired Director of Intelligence with 23 years of field experience in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. He has a Masters in International Relations from Pakistan, a Masters in Intelligence from Macquarie University Sydney, and has been a guest lecturer for various government agencies around the world.
Photo by EJ Wolfson on Unsplash
