On 23 January 2026, the U.S. Department of Defense (renamed 'Department of War' by executive order, but still officially Department of Defense) released the unclassified 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Since 2017, U.S. law has required the Secretary of Defense to provide an NDS in January every four years to the senior civilian and uniform leaders of the military departments and to its congressional overseers. By law, the NDS must contain specific information and be presented to congressional defense committees in classified form and accompanied by an unclassified summary. The publicly available NDS is the unclassified executive summary, so it is limited in scope, details, and specificity. These limitations mean the NDS we analyse is less ‘ends, ways, means’ strategy and more a messaging device to convey the Department’s priorities and alignment with the Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS). Although only required by law since 2017, four NDS have been published since 2005.
The Department of War really, really, really likes President Trump
The first thing that strikes the reader is the obsequiousness of the document. In less than 30 pages, ‘Trump’ is mentioned 47 times, often in exaggerated tones. For example, the introduction opens with the claim that President Trump “has rebuilt the American military to be the world’s absolute best - its most formidable fighting force” and goes on to describe the many ways Trump has rescued the United States and saved the world from disaster. The use of the President’s surname far surpasses previous defense strategies, including the Administration’s 2018 NDS where ‘Trump’ was never mentioned. Although the personal branding is record-setting for an NDS, it is consistent with the Administration’s NSS, where ‘Trump’ is mentioned 27 times (also a record). By law, the NDS is supposed to “support the most recent national security strategy” and the NDS fulfills this requirement through both its shared priorities and common ingratiating approach.
U.S. homeland, Western Hemisphere, and China
Setting aside the hyperbolic rhetoric, the document does a good job identifying how the Administration views the security environment, how it will prioritise its resources, and how allies and adversaries should expect it to behave. The document makes clear that the Administration’s focus is ‘America First’ and this means securing the United States’ borders and defending against threats on the ground, from the air, and in cyberspace. The “Defending the U.S. Homeland” Line of Effort (LOE) is clearly the priority of the four LOEs. Although labelled “homeland” this LOE extends beyond U.S. territory with an intent to “restore American military dominance in the Western Hemisphere” which the Administration believes requires securing access to “key terrain” such as Greenland and the Panama Canal.
While the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere are the Department’s priority, the document identifies China as the United States' main global adversary (the authors of the NDS deserve praise for removing the phrase “pacing challenge” from the document; that jargon was excessively used in the 2022 NDS). It acknowledges China’s rise and the challenges it poses but avoids making a U.S./China conflict seem inevitable. While it states that the U.S. desires “a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific”, it argues this posture is to ensure that “neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies”. The LOE aligned with China focuses on ensuring open and fair trade throughout the Indo-Pacific as its main objective and seeks to “deter China through strength, not confrontation”. Although China hawks might disagree, acknowledgement of Chinese power, the acceptance of China’s interest within its region, and the Administration’s firm but balanced rhetoric, is welcomed.
With a friend like this who needs….
As Trump is a theme in the document, so too are ‘allies’, but they do not receive the same warm embrace. The document mentions ‘allies’ 57 times, far more than previous defense strategies (exception is the 2022 NDS). Interestingly, NATO, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Israel are mentioned by name as allies, but the document seems to imply that more are included in this category. Of note, Israel is referred to as a model ally because it defended itself (not sure if this implies that the Administration is willing to invest more in the militaries of individual NATO countries). Although allies garner significant attention, there is a different tone in this NDS compared with earlier defense strategies. Previous strategies focused on shared interest, integration, and commitment among allies. The 2026 NDS focuses on allies shouldering more burden (LOE #3) and castigating them for not doing enough. Although the document does not say the U.S. will abandon allies, the Administration’s messaging is clear: only count on the U.S. if priorities overlap and do not stand in the way of U.S. interests.
For example, the NDS addresses the challenge Russia poses, particularly to Eastern Europe, but it minimizes the significance of the threat to broader Europe, let alone to the U.S. The document makes clear that while “the Department will continue to play a vital role in NATO”, this role will be based more on the perceived threat Russia poses towards U.S. interests which the Administration seems to believe is limited (no acknowledgement of the importance of European bases and access for U.S. power projection). The document makes clear it is adopting what it sees as a “realistic” military approach that is tied to the NSS’s “realistic” pursuit of economic dominance. Remaining consistent with the NSS, there is no mention of shared values and instead implies that Europe’s “decreasing share of economic strength” means its security is of less importance to the U.S.
Developing and securing the 'means' of strategy
The final LOE - “Supercharging the U.S. Defense Industrial Base” - focuses on ensuring the military has the weapons and resources necessary to execute the NDS. The Defense Industrial Base was a theme in the 2022 NDS, and in 2024 the Biden Administration published the first National Defense Industrial Strategy. Given the limited explanation in the unclassified 2026 NDS, it is unclear how this Administration’s focus differs from the Biden Administration’s in this area. Although the specifics of this effort are uncertain, the recent executive order “Prioritizing the Warfighter in Defense Contracting” sheds some light on the Administration’s approach. This executive order, which holds defense contractors accountable for their timeliness, product quality, and performance, shows the Administration is willing to confront defense industry giants. Although the Administration should be credited for holding the defense industry accountable, it is uncertain how it will determine when it is a government failure or an industry failure that affected performance.
Drastic shift from the last Trump NDS?
The 2026 NDS is significantly different to the 2018 NDS which came out during the first Trump Administration. The 2018 NDS - “Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” - focused on preparing the military for its role in the U.S. competition with China (competition is not mentioned in 2026). In 2018, allies were also a focus of the NDS but in a dissimilar way from 2026. During the first Trump Administration, competition required a “robust constellation of allies and partners” to “sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard an open international order”. In the 2026 NDS, allies are “dependents rather than partners, weaking our alliances and leaving us more vulnerable”. Quite a drastic change in perspective.
Conclusion: The good, the bad, and the concerning
Beyond the bombastic rhetoric and exaggerated claims, the NDS is clear about its priorities, and aligns with the NSS. One might not agree with the Administration’s world view or its unnecessarily combative approach, but the NDS (and the NSS) clearly sets priorities, manages expectations, and identifies where the Administration will assume risk. The document’s language is hubristic and blunt, but it deserves credit for its focus and transparency. Although the language is clear, will its approach achieve the desired ends (i.e. continued U.S. military and economic dominance)? Probably not.
The main reason why not is that it is not what the NDS says, but how the Administration’s actions, behavior and rhetoric affect the strategy that is important. Threatening allies and attempting to possess allied territories undermines the very alliances needed for the strategy to be successful. While the Administration is right to expect more defense spending from its allies and deserves credit for recent NATO pledged increases (Putin shares this credit, though), the increased expenditures do not help the U.S. if those countries are no longer its allies. The U.S. cannot remain “the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come” if it shatters the relationships that brought it that status.
It is also useful to consider how the Administration’s recent actions stack-up to the rhetoric regarding issues like Greenland, Iran, and Venezuela, three countries mentioned by name in the NDS. Although the importance of Greenland to the U.S. is mentioned in the NDS, Trump’s aggressive push for ownership is at odds with the document’s push for allies taking more of a role considering Denmark’s recent commitment to increase investment in Arctic defense. This investment, coupled with the fact that the U.S. and Denmark already have an agreement that allows U.S. significant access to Greenland, makes one wonder if it is security or legacy that is motivating Trump.
While the rhetoric on Greenland seems to make little sense, the recent actions towards Iran are more of a mixed bag. The NDS mentions the U.S. attack on Iran in June 2025 by name, stating it was done because “Iran will not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons”. While one can disagree with the Administration’s decision to bomb Iran in 2025, the action is consistent with the NDS. The area of Iran policy that is potentially inconsistent is if Trump follows through on his claim to attack Iran if it “violently kills peaceful protestors”. An attack motivated by Iran’s treatment of its people is not in line with the NDS critique of the post-Cold War presidential administrations. For example, it is hard to see how Trump’s recent threat to deploy U.S. forces are in-line with the statement, “they sent America’s brave sons and daughters to fight war after rudderless war to topple regimes and nation-build halfway around the world, in doing so eroding our military’s readiness and delaying modernization”. Trump has recently switched and tied the threat of U.S. force to other “demands” that are more consistent with the NDS. Seeing that Iran is less than “halfway around the world” from the U.S., I guess the Administration could claim that deploying “America’s brave sons and daughters” to fight there is not inconsistent with the NDS (although neither would be Iraq or Afghanistan).
Actions toward Venezuela seem mostly consistent with the NDS since it is in the Western Hemisphere and the Administration is tying it to the counternarcotics effort. Some experts have questioned the motivation for actions against Maduro, and the Administration’s release of Juan Orlando Hernandez raises questions about the consistency of Trump’s counternarcotics policy. In the end, however, Trump’s current policies towards Venezuela seem to be aligned with the NDS given the prioritization of the Western Hemisphere (plus Venezuela is less than “halfway around the world”). Any notion of Venezuelan rights as a motivation for its policy or the mentioning of human rights in its recent executive order on Cuba seem out of step with the NDS’s claim that it is “one of focused engagement abroad with a clear eye toward advancing the concrete, practical interests of Americans”.
Finally, the NDS is not wrong that the U.S. “squandered Americans’ will, resources, and even lives in foolish and grandiose adventures abroad”. What it seems to ignore is that it was not only American will, American resources, or American lives that the U.S. foolishly squandered. Callously questioning the service and sacrifices made by allies who stood by it is not only classless, but foolhardy. If the Administration continues down this current path, it might soon find itself the focus of burden sharing.
Dave Oakley is currently the Academic Director at the University of South Florida’s Global and National Security Institute. He previously served in the U.S. Army as a field artillery officer and strategist, in the Central Intelligence Agency as a Staff Operations Officer, and as a contractor at the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center.
Dave is on the editorial boards for Intelligence and National Security, InterPopulum, and JSOU Press. His book, Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship, was published by the University Press of Kentucky.
Dave's education includes a Ph.D. in Security Studies from Kansas State University, an MPA from the University of Oklahoma, a Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) from the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, an MMAS from the Army's Command and General Staff College, and a BA from Pittsburg State University.
Photo by William Rudolph on Unsplash
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