As the conflict in Ukraine continues into its fourth year with no obvious end in sight, it is apparent that the security challenges confronting the Ukrainian people represent a significant existential threat. This circumstance requires an intricate whole-of-society response that is both strategically advantageous and legally sound. The immediate need for survival under the profound existential pressures of the Russian conflict can relegate the consideration of international legal frameworks to a secondary or minor position. To safeguard the long-term integrity of Ukrainian society, however, the delivery of military success and the pursuance of international legal standards must be regarded as mutually reinforcing outcomes.
We begin this piece by outlining the legal considerations for the delivery of Partner Resistance Operations (PRO - sometimes referred to as Combined Resistance Operations). We then identify historical examples of PRO from the French Resistance during the Second World War and align these with the legal principles underpinning Ukraine’s resistance of the Russian war machine. We will explore the ambiguities of collaboration in Ukrainian areas under Russian control and query the Verkhovna Rada’s (the Ukrainian Parliament’s) implementation of specific resistance and collaboration laws. We believe that PRO is an essential component of Ukraine’s territorial defence, and contend that by ensuring PRO activities remain legally sound, the Ukrainian Government will be suitably positioned to establish Ukraine’s reputation as an advocate of international law, and to maximise the wellbeing of Ukrainians living and operating within these deeply challenging conditions.
Legal Considerations of Partner Resistance Operations
PRO is a collaborative military strategy which concerns the preservation of international boundaries in both the physical and cyber domains. PRO involves two or more parties with a shared objective of actively deterring conventional and sub-threshold threats to the territorial integrity of a targeted nation or region, or of restoring sovereignty to a partially or fully occupied region or country. These threats typically concern the prospect of imminent invasion and/or occupation from a prominent third-party. The establishment of international partnerships as a means of bolstering or restoring sovereignty is a recognised military strategy. Despite this, a universally agreed definition of PRO is yet to be agreed. As a result, PRO can also be regarded as support given to another nation, state, or legally recognised body in establishing and delivering full-spectrum resistance capabilities. These capabilities include the deepening of psychological resilience, the development of operational intelligence, and the delivery of legitimate kinetic action and associated strategic messaging. Despite the best efforts of the partnering nations or groups, the implementation of PRO can fall short of the desired ethical or legal parameters. It follows that to ensure the legal fortitude and operational output of full-spectrum resistance in Ukraine, a comprehensive legal framework must be ingrained within its national PRO strategy. For example, Ukraine should advocate for the significance of appropriate legal structures by observing ‘definitive laws regarding national resistance, including: funding, authority to conduct operations, legal status of personnel, and a host of other issues, promulgated prior to the need to employ resistance against an enemy.’
In recognition of the psycho-social challenges which confront those Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and impact their underlying drive to resist, we seek to inspire critical reflection of the legal basis of resistance by analysing certain legal, practical, and procedural issues that arose within French Resistance operations against Nazi occupation. For the French, the absence of a comprehensive, pre-agreed resistance strategy resulted in the disjointed development of activity, with varying tactics and levels of resistance taking place in each zone. The lack of occupation planning extended to practical, legal, and policy limitations and, as a result, no suitable, specific legislation was implemented to clearly define the legal parameters of resistance activity. These shortcomings resulted in a web of contentious issues that arose after the war; in particular, questions regarding the legitimacy of activity conducted under occupation (whether by resisters or 'collaborators') led to inconsistent punishments, vigilante justice, and reprisals. This is all the more remarkable given that it has been assessed that over 96,000 people from the Vichy regime 'collaborated', to varying degrees, with the Nazis throughout the period of occupation.
The absence of stabilising legal factors in post-war France contributed to the “l’epuration” or “cleansing” events carried out in the aftermath of the liberation. This included ‘... summary justice that was doled out to collaborators,’ the degradation of a justice system that was ‘... in tatters …’ and culminated in the Resistance setting up ‘... its own system of makeshift courts,’ thus allowing certain individuals to ‘... lethally pervert the [judicial] process.’ These events created a power vacuum which arose from uncertainty over the legitimacy of the government in exile, the puppet Vichy regime, and the question of how a liberated France should be governed with competing political factions proposing different outcomes. At the same time, a ‘... struggle was played out between those who wanted a return to order and normality, and those who looked to more revolutionary solutions’.
These circumstances might have been avoided with a higher standard of legal preparedness to invasion and subsequent occupation. For instance, the US occupation of Japan at the end of the Second World War is often cited in relation to this view. Although Japan’s reformation during occupation was marred by economic hardship, an emergent black market, and periods of political uncertainty that stemmed from the manipulation of certain legal principles, it may be argued that Japan’s notable geopolitical success is testament to the government’s delivery of societal reform through robust legislative structures and processes.
Socio-cultural variance between the historical French Resistance and Ukraine’s current resistance campaign notwithstanding, an examination of the development and operation of resistance movements in occupied France highlights important questions and learning points for the application of PRO in Ukraine’s occupied territories. Of particular importance is the need to ensure prior preparation through the formation of a comprehensive, bespoke, legally sound strategy for increasing resilience. The Verkhovna Rada deserves credit for its considerable efforts in developing the legal basis of resistance. At the same time, the broad implementation of collaboration laws has become a point of concern amongst certain humanitarian commentators. It is essential to note that a credible legal framework not only offers greater protections and a higher level of clarity to resistance operators in the field, but also preserves Ukraine’s reputation as an advocate of just legal process. PRO practitioners must safeguard the legitimacy of their cause and activities by applying the relevant legal doctrine at both the operational and tactical levels, thus highlighting the need for PRO practitioners to consider the Law of War (LOW) or International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
Little distinction exists between LOW and LOAC. Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Convention states that ‘the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict.’ From a PRO perspective, it is noteworthy that Article 2 also confirms that the 1949 Convention applies to ‘all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance’. As LOAC remains principally concerned with the practical implementation of law, or Jus in bello, by military forces and their partners, this is a valuable concept.
Based upon principles from a variety of international conventions and treaties concerned with the ‘just’ implementation of armed conflict, LOAC comprises relevant international and domestic law (including service law). It provides for the protection and humane treatment of combatants and non-combatants and, as such, both imposes duties upon and grants rights to individuals. It is founded upon four interconnected pillars: I. Military Necessity, II. Distinction, III. Proportionality, and IV. Humanity. The comprehensive nature of this legal foundation offers a robust grounding for armed conflict. Should a resistance partner evolve through the ‘continuum of categories of resistance’ which have been laid out by Eric Hahn, in terms of ‘the organisation of resistance groups and the intensity and duration of resistance activities’, then the corresponding legal status evolves accordingly. Notably, LOAC is triggered at the point at which a resistance movement reaches a state of hostilities. Lower intensity phases of resistance, whilst engaging host nation (legal) and IHL provisions, do not meet the threshold for LOAC to apply. They must, however, be given due consideration.
An important distinction can be made between IHL and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). IHL is triggered at the point of insurgency on the resistance continuum and then applies at all higher levels. Equally, IHRL is increasingly viewed as applicable across the entire continuum of resistance activity, being relevant in peacetime and in war. PRO practitioners should, therefore, ensure their conduct – and that of partners – is consistent with IHRL, whilst remaining aware of movement by partners along the resistance continuum.
Adapted from Erin Hahn et al.'s Continuum of Categories of Resistance
As Host Nation Law (HNL) is applicable at the foundation levels of the resistance continuum, a comprehensive awareness of HNL is essential for PRO practitioners. It is sensible to assume that HNL applies to individuals during all levels of resistance activity. For example, emergency or contingency measures may be implemented to provide assurance to a resistance operator that he/she will not be prosecuted for undertaking certain activities in times of crisis that may otherwise be prohibited. In addition, clear boundaries for the activity, in line with treaty obligations and customary international norms, are likely to bolster the legitimacy of any resistance framework in the eyes of international partners. The practical, political, and ethical links between international partners and local populations underpin a resistance campaign. It is, therefore, essential to examine the legal considerations of PRO recruitment, and ensure that those matters which can threaten the integrity of resistance operations are given due regard.
Fault Lines in Resistance – Collaboration Amongst the Local Population
The definitive assessment of either an individual’s or a group’s motivation to engage in resistance activities is a monumental challenge that requires a level of analysis beyond the scope of this piece. Nevertheless, as successful resistance operations are based upon a social contract between resistance networks and civilian populations, it is advisable to ensure that their interactions remain integrated and legally valid. Considering contemporary reporting about the legal processing of individuals alleged to have collaborated with the Russian state against Ukraine, it is useful to revisit the ‘cleansing’ events or the épuration légale (legal purge) that took place in newly liberated France in the mid-late 1940s.
The legal purge provides insight into the challenges associated with a society’s preparedness to respond to the ambiguity of the post-occupation period and, critically, its leaders’ and representatives’ implementation of due legal processes. Notably, questions concerning the structure and application of the new legal system that facilitated the legal purge expose the reputational harm that can arise from inconsistencies in the post-conflict handling of actual or suspected collaboration.
Ukraine’s resistance-specific legislation was developed in the form of Law 5557 On the Fundamentals of National Resistance 2022, to establish a comprehensive legal framework for the formation and operational delivery of national resistance activity. The legislation endorses a total defence perspective which facilitates broad involvement of society in actions intended to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. It also establishes and defines the key tasks of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), the resistance movement, and Ukrainian citizens in preparing for resistance.
The framework determines the procedures for organising, preparing, and conducting territorial defence and resistance. Thereafter, it provides for the regulation of state authorities and local self-government bodies, sets out the principles of financing and material support of the national resistance, and ensures the social protection of military personnel and volunteers of the TDF - as well as other persons performing tasks in aid of the resistance. Of further consequence is the introduction of Art. 111-1 to the Criminal Code of Ukraine (added through the Law of Ukraine No. 2108-IX of 3 March 2022). This establishes criminal liability for activities deemed to fall under the general term of ‘collaborationism’. The Ukrainian Government’s implementation of ‘collaborationism laws’ to address a rapidly evolving legal issue is consistent with those of the committees established by De Gaulle in 1944 to address acts undertaken by French citizens to endorse the Nazi regime. Whilst the French Government deemed that those who had openly collaborated could be prosecuted for treason under Article 75 of the Criminal Code, additional legal measures were required in respect of those persons who had provided indirect support to the occupying regime.Thus, the offence of indignité nationale, defined as ‘the situation in which has placed himself a person who, directly or indirectly, had voluntarilyhelped Germany or its Allies, or affected the unity of the nation or the liberty or equality of the French’ was established.
Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, allegations of collaboration by Ukrainian citizens with a foreign power would, most likely, have been conducted in accordance with the Ukrainian Lustration Act 2014. As this act is not specifically intended to address the myriad psycho-social issues associated with collaboration, the societal and legal complexities created by Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 necessitated a robust Ukrainian position on collaboration and a review of the legal principles. Although these efforts remain ongoing, imprecision regarding the definition of ‘collaborationism’, and the breadth of activities which it encompasses, limited clarity regarding the essential features of these activities, and the definitive identification of those parties who are alleged to be involved attracts marked scrutiny.
The legislative work undertaken by the Ukrainian government since 2014 is noteworthy.Worryingly, contemporary reporting cites the detention of an estimated 1,500 individuals and the opening of over 8,000 criminal cases regarding alleged collaboration.Whilst this suggests that Ukraine is implementing established legal proceedings tailored to its status of partial occupation, for Ukraine to safeguard its legitimacy, full transparency of its legal frameworks and processes would be wise.
Although it must be acknowledged that collaboration can occur in any location, those activities associated with collaborationism relate to conduct in those regions of Ukraine that are, as of February 2026, under actual or claimed Russian control.
BBC map of Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine, February 2026
Collaborative activities in Russian-controlled areas include public pronouncements in support of an aggressor state, transfer of resources to illegal armed or paramilitary formations, economic cooperation with the aggressor state or illegal authorities, and voluntary occupation by Ukrainian citizens of positions related to the administrative or economic functions in what are termed ‘illegal authorities’. There are difficulties with the legislation, especially post-occupation, with a significant variation in penalties depending on which article a charge was brought. It seems to be also the case that people conducting ‘perfectly legitimate’ (humanitarian) activities (such as the provision of medical services or operating grocery stores) in occupied territories are liable for prosecution under Art. 111-1.
The outcomes of those resistance operations that comply with a robust legal framework provide an important way of enhancing the cohesion of those people living under occupation. These standards offer resistance personnel, and the societies within which they operate, a crucial sense of legal and ethical legitimacy. At the same time, such standards limit the scope for hostile information campaigns that seek to discredit the occupied country. Finally, adherence to an internationally respected legal framework should minimise the likelihood of former resistance operators experiencing psychological dissonance associated with social or legal scrutiny that may be applied to their conduct post-liberation.
Conclusion
PRO provides the Ukrainian people with a legitimate, highly credible means of resisting Russian aggression. Given the nature of resistance activities, the legal principles that govern it must be carefully considered and thoughtfully implemented. As a starting point, resistance operations should be based upon a fusion of IHRL and HNL. Historical experiences of the French Resistance, considered within the fluidity of the current conflict, suggest that the Ukrainian Government should continue to refine its legal framework. These refinements must be informed by IHL, IHRL, and LOAC, as well as relevant international treaty obligations and customary norms. Similarly, the practical alignment of PRO within HNL should be given primacy and scrutinised in a greater level of detail than is possible here.
The evolution in geopolitical thinking around conventional military operations that enabled the 1949 Geneva Convention may inspire a similar shift in global perceptions of PRO. Comprehensive recognition of the societal ambiguities surrounding PRO would lead to Ukraine’s Law 5557 and Art. 111-1 acquiring particular significance in the delivery of full-spectrum resistance operations and may serve as model for other nations.An enhanced legal framework would help to safeguard Ukraine’s reputation as an advocate of international law. Moreover, it may reduce the likelihood of resistance operators and/or their partners experiencing unwarranted scrutiny, thereby mitigating the long-term psychological effects of combat. Crucially, sound legal assurance reduces the scope for hostile forces to instigate those disinformation campaigns that can erode popular support and degrade societal cohesion. The Verkhovna Rada must be ready for this challenge.
Main photo by Žilvinas Ka on Unsplash
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